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MARRIAGE AND OPPORTUNISM
MARGARET F. BRINIG and STEVEN M. CRAFTON*
Our marriage is dead, when the pleasure is fled:
Twas pleasure first made it an oath.'
I. INTRODUCTION
SPOUSE abuse is no longer a secret. It has become a thorn in America's
conscience. Abuse even warranted a lengthy Supreme Court discussion
in an opinion on abortion.' It is certainly worth thinking about whether
anything systemic caused the apparent outbreak of violence in the home.
If there is a legal "fix" that would remove incentives to abuse, and there-
fore reduce the incidence of abuse at the margin, we should know about
it.
It is the thesis of this article that increased abuse and other undesirable
behavior is a natural consequence of the fact that in some states the
marriage contract cannot be enforced. We therefore reexamine the idea
of marriage as a relational contract, pose the question of whether it has
been rendered illusory by reforms in family law, and demonstrate empiri-
cally that changes in divorce and alimony statutes affect not only divorce
* Respectively, Professor of Law and Associate Professor of Law and Associate Dean
for Academic Affairs, George Mason University. We gratefully acknowledge the research
support from the Sarah Scaife and John M. Olin Foundations and thank participants at the
Washington-Baltimore-Virginia Women Law Professors Conference on Scholarship and law
and economics workshops at Georgetown Law Center, George Mason Law School, and
the University of Toronto Faculty of Law. Many individuals provided helpful comments,
including Judge Richard Posner and Professors Douglas Allen, Christopher Bruce, June
Carbone, Lloyd Cohen, Ian Mackaay, Timothy Muris, Milton Regan, Carl Schneider, Eliza-
beth Scott, Jeffrey Stake, and Michael Trebilcock. We especially thank David Levy of the
Public Choice Center for his invaluable assistance with the econometrics and Barbara
Stough for research assistance.
1 John Dryden, Songs 25.7 (1673).
2 Planned Parenthood of SE Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. - , *98-108, *114-19, 112 S. Ct.
2791 (1992).
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rates and the parties' relative wealth following divorce but also their
behavior prior to and during marriage. We conclude that it is time to
question whether unilateral no-fault divorce is worth its costs to the insti-
tution of marriage.
Marriage has been characterized alternatively as a sacrament, an insti-
tution, a status, and a partnership.' Although each of these terms is de-
scriptive, and adds to our sense of what marriage is and can be, for
purposes of economic analysis it is more useful to look at marriage as a
contract. No one denies the fact that it is a contract that begins the
marriage relationship, but when we speak of what exists after its incep-
tion, the contract analogy appears problematic. One objection to thinking
of the ongoing marriage as a contract is that many of the terms of the
marriage are prescribed by the state, not to be varied by the parties'
private agreements.4 Perhaps a more telling criticism is that much of what
makes a good marriage has to do with the affective relationship bet-
ween the spouses.' It seems improper to speak of something at once so
intimate and so integral in the same terms used for a business transac-
tion.6
Despite these difficulties, academics writing about marriage 7 and jurists
dealing with its consequences8 frequently use the language of implicit, or
long-term, relational contract. The relationship is designed to endure for
a long time (hopefully for the lifetime of the parties) and to be so complex
that any attempt to specify in detail all of its terms would be futile as
' June Carbone & Margaret Brinig, Rethinking Marriage: Feminist Ideology, Economic
Change, and Divorce Reform, 65 Tul. L. Rev. 953, 957-61 (1991); Michael Trebilcock &
Rosamin Keshvani, The Role of Private Ordering in Family Law: A Law and Economics
Perspective, 41 U. Toronto L. J. 533, 537-39 (1991).
' Ira Ellman, The Theory of Alimony, 77 Cal. L. Rev. 1 (1989); Lloyd Cohen, Marriage,
Divorce and Quasi Rents; or, "I Gave Him the Best Years of My Life," 16 J. Legal Stud.
267, 272 (1987); Lee Teitelbaum, Placing the Family in Context, 22 U.C. Davis L. Rev.
801, 805 (1989); Douglas Allen, An Inquiry into the State's Role in Marriage, 13 J. Econ.
Behav. & Org. 171 (1990); Gary Becker & Kevin Murphy, The Family and the State, 31 J.
Law & Econ. 1 (1988). Becker and Murphy note that because minor children cannot con-
tract, state involvement efficiently takes the place of private arrangements.
5 Teitelbaum, supra note 4, at 805; and Milton C. Regan, Family Law and the Pursuit of
Intimacy (1993).
6 For example, Ellman, supra note 4, at 30, argues that instead of the usual profit incen-
tive, in marriage it is the relationship itself that is the goal and purpose of the venture.
Margaret F. Brinig & June Carbone, The Reliance Interest in Marriage and Divorce,
62 Tul. L. Rev. 855 (1988); Frances Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology
and Legal Reform, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1497, 1518-19 (1983); Comment, Marriage as Contract:
Towards a Functional Redefinition of Marital Status, 9 Colum. J. L. & Soc. Probs. 607
(1973).
' See, for example, Moulin v. Monteleone, 165 La. 169, 115 So. 447 (1928); Robinson v.
Robinson, 187 Conn. 70, 72, 444 A.2d 234, 236 (1982).
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well as perhaps destructive. It is, moreover, exactly the sort of enterprise
in which it is efficient for the parties to make significant and specific
investments: contributions of time and energy and money, to each other
and to their children, that may not see fruition for many years and that
may be worthless if the relationship does not endure.9
In any other contract, even if the agreement allows either party to
terminate the relationship at will, the parties can still expect their invest-
ments to be protected and their dealings to be governed by the laws of
contract through the usual damage remedies in cases of breach.° Other-
wise, no one would enter into such agreements or make such invest-
ments, for who would choose a deal with unenforceable terms?
While marriage has many of the characteristics of relational con-
tracting, it has become in many places a kind of unenforceable, illusory
contract:"' it is splendid as long as both spouses are committed to the
relationship but ethereal once one spouse decides to take advantage of
the other. The thesis of this article is that the terms of the marriage
contract are, to a great extent, the expectations of the parties as to the
allowable parameters of marital behavior. We argue that changes in the
institutional structure reduce the cost to one or both of the parties of
undertaking activities inconsistent with the marital agreement. This in-
consistent behavior is what we define as "opportunistic behavior" in the
marital context. The changes in the institutional structure that make mari-
tal promises unenforceable and allow opportunistic behavior are the en-
actment in many states of no-fault divorce with the simultaneous removal
of fault (breach) as a consideration in grants of spousal support and prop-
erty division. 2 A marriage is, as are many business relationships, now
' See Cohen, supra note 4, at 268. Because of the difference in men's and women's
spousal services, and the greater specificity of women's investments in the mar-
riage,"women, as a class, lose systematically far more than do men" by divorce.
"0 See, for example, Dresser Industries, Inc. v. Pyrrhus AG, 936 F.2d 921 (7th Cir. 1991);
Sofa Gallery, Inc. v. Stratford Co., 872 F.2d 259 (8th Cir. 1989); Carpenter Paper Co. v.
Kellogg, 114 Cal. App. 2d 640, 251 P.2d 40 (1953); Robinhorne Const. Corp. v. Snyder,
113 I11. App. 2d 288, 251 N.E.2d 641 (1969).
11 See, for example, Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 Harv. L. Rev. 553, 570
(1933). Of course, all promises are not enforceable. See, for example, Richard Posner,
Gratuitous Promises in Economics and Law, 6 J. Legal Stud. 411 (1977); Anthony Kronman,
Contract Law and the State of Nature, I J. L. Econ. & Org. 5 (1985).
12 Elizabeth Scott, Rational Decisionmaking about Marriage and Divorce, 76 Va. L. Rev.
9, 52 (1990); Theodore Haas, The Rationality and Enforceability of Contractual Restrictions
on Divorce, 66 N.C. L. Rev. 879, 884 (1988). In 1972, Victor Schwartz suggested a tort
action for "abuse of the marital relationship" to fill the gap left by the no-fault opportunity
to escape "any civil or criminal sanctions for such conduct." The Serious Marital Offender:
Tort Law as a Solution, 6 Fam. L. Q. 219 (1972).
Much of the work by economists on the consequences of no-fault has as its foundation
the important piece by Elisabeth Landes, Economics of Alimony, 7 J. Legal Stud. 35 (1978),
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terminable at will, 3 but without penalties for breach of other condi-
tions. 14
What would one predict in places where there is no way to enforce the
marriage contract? Assuming that couples contemplating marriage pay
any attention to these things, 5 one would hypothesize fewer marriages
ex ante, fewer children (born later, after a longer trial period), more
investment in individual careers rather than in the marriage, more di-
vorces, and, ex post, more breaches by spouses in positions to behave
opportunistically. 6 Some of these consequences may be temporary. At
some future time, everyone might view marriage as little more than a
long-term date, entered into to please parents or to signal that the rela-
tionship is exclusive. Since there would be fewer negative consequences
for either party, such a marriage might be entered into more rather than
less frequently. This "lite" version of marriage, however, would not
support much investment by either spouse. The depressive effect on the
analyzing the effects of enacting unilateral divorce legislation and the importance of the
institution of alimony.
13 See, for example, Donald Butler & Marilyn Russell, Casting Stones: The Role of Fault
in Virginia Divorce Proceedings, 20 U. Richmond L. Rev. 290, 295 (1986). In a state where
there is no-fault divorce, termination of the marriage is not in itself breach, so there is no
legal reason for awarding either party the loss. See Brinig & Carbone, supra note 7, at 876
& n.89. See also Lynn Wardle, No-Fault Divorce and the Divorce Conundrum, 1991 B.Y.U.
L. Rev. 79, 99-100 (no-fault may bring more contests over collateral matters such as prop-
erty distribution, spousal support, and child custody).
Our referee has pointed out that the breaching husband could lose not only support but
also the services of the nonbreaching wife, while after divorce she need provide him no
future services. There are two replies to his statement. First, because of the marriage
market, the husband will probably be in a much better position following dissolution of the
marriage than will his mate. Second, she is not released from all her marital obligations at
the time of divorce: if she remarries or cohabits, she loses her right to alimony in many
states.
14 Scott, supra note 12, at 53; Philip Selznick, The Idea of a Communitarian Morality,
75 Cal. L. Rev. 445, 452 (1987); Mary Ann Glendon, State, Law and Family: Family Law
in Transition in the United States and Europe 25 (1981).
15 The fact that they are increasingly entering into premarital contracts suggests that they
might, but there is contrary evidence as well. See, for example, Scott, supra note 12; and
Lynn Baker & Donald Emery, When Every Relationship Is above Average, 17 L. & Hum.
Behav. 439 (1993).
16 As defined by Timothy Muris, opportunistic behavior "occurs when a performing party
behaves contrary to the other party's understanding of their contract, but not necessarily
contrary to the explicit terms of the agreement, leading to a transfer of wealth from the
other party to the performer." Opportunistic Behavior and the Law of Contracts, 65 Minn.
L. Rev. 521 (1981). Even a threat is costly because resources are expended by both parties
to perpetrate or protect against the behavior. Id. at 524. See also Oliver Williamson, Markets
and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications (1975); Benjamin Klein, Robert Craw-
ford, & Armen Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive
Contracting Process, 21 J. Law & Econ. 297 (1978); and Oliver Williamson, Transaction
Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J. Law & Econ. 233 (1979).
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birth rate should continue. Thus it may be the traditional type of mar-
riage, meaning one with substantial investments, that is on a permanent
decline. This article presents a theoretical discussion and an empirical
test of the effects of the switch to no-fault divorce, which made the
marriage contract illusory. We begin in Part II with an analysis of the
elements of the marriage contract and a discussion of the historical en-
forcement of its terms. Part III discusses the idea of marriage as a rela-
tional contract in the context of such contracts in commercial law. Part IV
presents an empirical analysis of three predictions of the illusory contract
concept: fewer marriages, fewer children, and more opportunism in the
form of spousal abuse. Part V concludes that it is time to rethink enforce-
ability of the marriage contract.
II. THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT
A. Terms of the Marriage Contract
When couples marry, they may be unaware of exactly what responsibil-
ities they are undertaking. 7 They may not think that the ceremony that
marks their becoming husband and wife is anything but a rite of passage.
Almost certainly they are not thinking of the rubric of "contract": of
consideration and enforceability. Yet even the words of the marriage
ceremony give substantive content to the idea of marriage. The marriage
contract usually begins with the promise of each party to take the other
as a wedded spouse, to have and to hold, for richer or poorer, in sickness
and in health, for better or for worse, from this day forward, "as long as
life shall last."' 18 These are words in present tense, unlike those of the
engagement contract, and are therefore not simply hopes of what is to
be. At the very least they mean that the parties intend their relationship
to last permanently, 9 that they plan to live together, care for each other,20
and support each other.2' They anticipate changes and adversity and
17 Baker & Emery, supra note 15.
'8 These words are from the West Virginia Code, § 48-1-12b, prescribing the exact ritual
for the celebration of marriage by judges. Virginia is unique in having a requirement.
'9 Compare Marriage of Dawley, 17 Cal. 3d 342, 131 Cal. Rptr. 3, 551 P.2d 323 (1973).
20 See Department of Human Resources v. Williams, 130 Ga. App. 149, 202 S.E.2d 504
(1973).
21 See Fincham v. Fincham, 160 Kan. 683, 165 P.2d 209 (1946); Hilbert v. Hilbert, 168
Md. 364, 177 A. 914 (1935); French v. McAnarney, 209 Mass. 544, 195 N.E. 714 (1935);
Fricke v. Fricke, 257 Wis. 124, 42 N.W.2d 500 (1950); In re Higgason's Marriage, 10 Cal.
3d 476, 110 Cal. Rptr. 897, 516 P.2d 289 (1973)(medical care).
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pledge to work through them.22 In some ceremonies, the couple also
makes promises to "love and cherish" and to "forsake all others."
Whether or not these words are used, the state will assume that the
spouses will be civil to each other, respecting bodily integrity.23 In most
states, there is the further explicit pronouncement that the parties will
be sexually faithful to each other.24
The fact that the promises made during the marriage ceremony have
explicit consequences can be demonstrated in several ways. First, an
intention (which exists at the time of marriage) by one of the parties not
to perform one of the "essentials of the marriage relationship" will allow
the other to obtain an annulment of the marriage on grounds of fraud.25
Physical or mental incapacity to perform will likewise be grounds for
what is, in effect, rescission of the marriage contract.26 Second, although
many aspects of the marriage relationship can be modified by the parties'
written agreement, certain terms, those included in every marriage con-
tract, cannot be altered.27 Third, in those states continuing to have fault
grounds for divorce, breach of the marital promises by one party will
allow the other to sue for divorce,28 in addition to any other remedies
available under civil or criminal law,29 and may affect the award of ali-
mony or the distribution of property. We turn now to a discussion of
22 Scott, supra note 12, at 12. Robert Scott, in Conflict and Cooperation in Long Term
Contracts, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 2005, 2007 (1987), notes that initially parties to long-term con-
tracts wish to distribute risks in the least burdensome way. Once conditions change they
seek adjustments to realize greater benefits from the enterprise.
23 Cruelty is a cause of action for divorce in many states. See, for example, I11. Ann.
Stat. ch. 40, § 401(2); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. tit. 3, § 208-1; N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 170;
Pa. Cons. Stat. § 201A(b).
24 Adultery is a cause of action wherever fault divorce has been retained. See, for exam-
ple, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:34-2; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3105.01; Tex. Fam. Code § 3.02;
Va. Code Ann. § 20-91.
25 See, for example, Cal. Civ. Code § 4425; I11. Rev. Stat. ch. 40, 301; Mich. Comp.
Laws § 552.38; N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 7; 23 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 205; Tex. Fam. Code § 2.44.
See, generally, Margaret Brinig & Michael Alexeev, Fraud in Courtship: Annulment and
Divorce, I, No. 4 Eur. J. L. & Econ. (in press 1994).
26 See, for example, Ga. Code § 19-5-3; Idaho Code § 32-304; Ind. Code § 31-1-11.5-3;
Md. Code Ann. § 7-103; Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. tit. 3, § 208-1; Va. Code § 20-45.11 (b).
27 This would include provision of spousal support and necessaries and the infinite dura-
tion of the marriage. See notes 19 and 20 supra. Such standardized terms reduce transaction
costs and make parties better off if they would have been agreed to anyway. Charles Goetz
& Robert Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 Va. L. Rev. 1089, 1090 (1981); Becker
& Murphy, supra note 4; see also Allen, supra note 4.
' See, for example, Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 40, § 401(2); Ind. Code § 31-1-11.5-3; Mass. Gen.
Laws Ann. tit. 3, § 208-1; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:34-2; N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 170; Ohio
Rev. Code Ann. § 3105.01; 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 201 (A)(b); Tex. Fam. Code § 3.02-3.05;
Va. Code § 20-91.
29 This might include tort actions and criminal actions for adultery or assault and battery.
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historical models of marriage, emphasizing the way the terms of the mar-
riage contract discussed above were enforced in each time period.
B. The "Old Marriage" and the "New Marriage"
For the first sixteen hundred years of the Christian era, marriages were
viewed as indissoluble,3" as well as central to the preservation of land
within particular families.3 Although affection might grow out of long
and close association between the spouses, it was by no means necessary
for the practical purposes of marriage. This oldest and nearly universal
model of marriage became obsolete in England and her colonies as first
the Church, and then land, ceased being necessarily central to the rela-
tionship.32 Marriage for romantic reasons became the ideal, and since
human emotions need not remain eternally constant, and because mar-
riage was no longer absolutely necessary for wealth, divorce became
practically possible.33
The consolidated remedy of divorce and alimony became an exclusive
remedy during the nineteenth century, largely because of the develop-
ment of the doctrine of interspousal immunity. Although a spouse could
sue for breach of contract or for ejectment from solely owned property,
there could be no action for torts to person or property. In part this was
because of a reluctance to become involved with the intimacies of the
marital relationship, in part because the doctrine showed a fear of dis-
rupting marital stability that probably was not warranted, given the sever-
ity of some of the harm alleged. As one court said, "We will not inflict
upon society the greater evil of raising the curtain upon domestic privacy
to punish the lesser evil of trifling violence." 34
This, then was the "old marriage," an enforceable contract designed
for the most part to be permanent, which encouraged values of altruism,
30 William Everett, Contract and Covenant in Human Community, 36 Emory L. J. 557,
560 (1987). Most early clerics interpreted the Bible to mean that validly contracted marriages
could not be dissolved. The Catholic Church formalized this position at the Council of
Trent in 1563. Roderick Phillips, Putting Asunder: A History of Divorce in Western Society
34-36 (1988). Annulment was available because without a marriage there was no bond to
dissolve.
31 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries 358, 408.
32 Edward Shorter, The Making of the Modern Family 255-68 (1975); Carbone & Brinig,
supra note 3, at 962-65; Phillips, supra note 30, at 364-69, 378-82; Carl Schneider, Moral
Discourse and the Transformation of American Family Law, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 1803, 1842-
45 (1985).
33 Michael Grossberg, Guarding the Altar: Physiological Restrictions and the Rise of
State Intervention in Matrimony, 26 Am. J. Legal Hist. 197, 208 (1982); Shorter, supra note
32, at 5; Mary Ann Glendon, The New Family and the New Property, ch. 1 (1975).
34 State v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. 453, 459 (1868).
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sharing, and investment in the marriage. 35 The idea of fault, and of ali-
mony as damages for breach of the terms of the marriage contract, 36 was
central to the stability of this scheme, for the threat of an action for
damages would encourage women to invest specifically in the marriage
while encouraging their husbands to adhere to their portion of the mar-
riage bargain.37 This freed husbands to invest in market skills, easily
transferable to a new relationship, and encouraged more efficient produc-
tion of market and household goods because of wives' comparative ad-
vantage in "household production.-
38
The "old marriage," which might have existed at any time prior to the
1960s, was characterized always in terms of an entity or a union rather
than as some sort of an arrangement for gain between two players.39
There was a clear understanding of what conduct was acceptable and
what the terms of the contract were.40 And there were clear consequences
for breaching those standards: for women, the loss of their status and
support, 41 for men, the loss of wealth through property division or al-
imony .41
The "old marriage," however, began to be threatened as an institution
by the Progressive Era. The mortal blow came in the 1940s, when because
of World War II large numbers of women entered the marketplace.43
Soon a pattern emerged of numbers of unhappy spouses going to states
35 See, for instance, Scott, supra note 12, at 12. See also Jeffrey Stake, Mandatory
Planning for Divorce, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 397 (1992).
36 "Damages" here is used in its broader sense including the remedy of specific perfor-
mance of some marital obligations. See, for example, James Leitzel, Reliance and Contract
Breach, 52 L. & Contemp. Probs. 87 (1989); Steven Shavell, Design of Contract and Reme-
dies for Breach, 99 Q. J. Econ. 121 (1984). Alimony was equivalent to damages in the sense
that it continued marital obligations. See Brinig & Carbone, supra note 7, at 870-72; Allen
Parkman, Remedies for Breach of the Marriage Contract (paper presented at the George
Mason Law and Economic Center's Conference honoring Judge Richard Posner, January
28, 1993).
37 See, for example, Sidney v. Sidney, 4 Sw. & Tr. 178, 164 Eng. Rep. 1485 (1865).
38 Gary Becker, A Treatise on the Family, ch. 2 (1981).
39 Scott, supra note 12, at 12; Everett, supra note 30, at 558; Phillips, supra note 30, at
17.
40 Hendrik Hartog, Marital Exits and Marital Expectations in Nineteenth Century
America, 80 Geo. L. J. 95 (1991).
41 Max Rheinstein, The Law of Divorce and the Problem of Marriage Stability, 9 Vand.
L. Rev. 633, 654 (1956); Lawrence Friedman & Robert Percival, Who Sues for Divorce? 5
J. Legal Stud. 61, 76-77 (1976).
42 Trebilcock & Keshvani, supra note 3, at 539-40, 544.
43 Teitelbaum, supra note 4, at 810-11; Daphne Spain & Suzanne Bianchi, How Women
Have Changed, 5 Am. Demographics 18 (May 1983); and Paula England & George Farkas,
Households, Employment and Gender: A Social, Economic and Demographic View 148
(1986).
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where divorces were easier or less costly to obtain and procuring
"quickie" ends to their marriages. Another means to evade a relatively
strict divorce law was the practice of collusive or fraudulent divorce,
where the complaining spouse would perjure himself or herself or actually
manufacture incidents (most often, of adultery) with the collaboration of
the other partner.'
"No-fault" divorce was first introduced in 1969 in California, which
until then had retained adultery as its only ground for divorce.45 California
divorces could now be granted upon a finding of "irretrievable break-
down of the marriage," which not only eliminated the necessity for a
showing of fault but also the need for both spouses agreeing to the di-
vorce.46 The California statute was heralded by its proponents as the
opportunity for release from moribund marriages. Some feminists argued
that with greater financial opportunities available to women outside mar-
riage and no barriers to exit from wedlock, women ought to be truly free
to reach their individual potential. In addition, the threat of fault divorce,
with its disastrous economic consequences, would no longer be there to
penalize them if they left a bad marriage.47
Freedom, however, from the restrictions of fault divorces, that is, a
nonfault liability rule, proved troublesome for the institution of alimony.
Since fault (breach), which had previously been the trigger for alimony
(damages), was no longer necessary (or available, in some cases) for
divorce, alimony was to serve the function of providing for the needy
spouse who could not support himself or herself because of lack of job
training or education or the competing burdens of child care. Alimony
" Rheinstein, supra note 41, at 643. Friedman & Percival, supra note 41, at 65 & n.l I;
and Herbert Jacob, Silent Revolution: The Transformation of Divorce Law in the United
States 33-35, 47-51 (1988).
45 Before 1967, several states allowed divorce upon the "no-fault" ground of "living
separate and apart" for some period of time. This usually required both spouses to agree
to divorce, however, since otherwise the departure of one spouse would be desertion. This
separation ground remains the only "no-fault" ground in a number of states. Friedman &
Percival, supra note 41, at 67.
46 This is called "unilateral" divorce in some papers. See, for example, Elizabeth Peters,
Marriage and Divorce: Informational Constraints and Private Contracting, 76 Am. Econ.
Rev. 437 (1986); Parkman, supra note 36.
47 See, for example, Martha Fineman, The Illusion of Equality 53-75 (1991); Martha
Fineman, Implementing Equality: Ideology, Contradiction and Social Change, 1983 Wis.
L. Rev. 789; Grace Blumberg, Reworking the Past, Imagining the Future: On Jacob's Silent
Revolution, 16 L. & Soc. Inquiry 115, 130-31 (1991). Jacob suggests, however, that femi-
nists were not a part of the California no-fault divorce movement. See Jacob, supra note
44, at 95-86. See also Herma Hill Kay, An Appraisal of California's No-Fault Divorce
Law, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 291 (1987); Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference, 56 U. Cin. L.
Rev. 1 (1987); and Milton Regan, Divorce Reform and the Legacy of Gender, 90 Mich. L.
Rev. 1453, 1464-65 (1992).
THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES
was only to be a temporary measure, for once the dependent spouse was
rehabilitated, or was no longer in need, alimony payments should not
bind the other spouse financially. The marriage relationship ended in a
"clean break." 48 The primary method of securing economic equality was
to be through (nonhuman capital) property distribution, which could be
made without regard to fault and with a recognition that each spouse
contributed to the marriage as a partner, whether working in the home
or the labor market.49
The changes to equitable distribution of property and the provision of
alimony in cases of real need, however, have not been complete solu-
tions. Since many women do not earn as much as their husbands, their
opportunity costs of remaining out of the market are lower, and fre-
quently they remain primary caretakers for their children.51 Despite gen-
der neutrality of custody laws, if the couple breaks up, they still get child
custody. In those marriages that do not last long enough to accumulate
significant tangible property,52 many women upon divorce have found
themselves with lower wealth than before no-fault divorce. This unin-
tended consequence of no-fault divorce has been noted by many writers.53
' Jacob, supra note 44, at 122. Texas never allowed alimony following an absolute
divorce and views it "like car payments on a car that's been wrecked." Levinsohn, Break-
ing Up Is Still Hard to Do, Chicago Tribune Sunday Magazine, October 21, 1990, at 16.
The "clean break" concept is criticized by Milton Regan in Market Discourse and Moral
Neutrality in Divorce Law (paper presented at the Utah Law School, October 15, 1993).
1 Community property jurisdictions have always viewed marriage as creating a commu-
nity of assets to be shared equally upon its dissolution, whether by death or divorce.
Michael Vaughn, The Policy of Community Property and Interspousal Transactions, 19
Baylor L. Rev. 20 (1967). The difference between the two regimes is discussed in Susan
Prager, Sharing Principles and the Future of Marital Property Law, 25 UCLA L. Rev. 1
(1977).
5 England & Farkas, supra note 43; Victor Fuchs, Women's Quest for Economic Equal-
ity 44-45 (1988).
"1 See, for example, Gary Crippen, Stumbling beyond Best Interests of the Child: Reex-
amining Child Custody Standard-setting in the Wake of Minnesota's Four Year Experiment
with the Primary Caretaker Preference, 75 Minn. L. Rev. 427, 453 (1990); Elizabeth Scott
& Carolyn Derdeyn, Rethinking Joint Custody, 45 Ohio St. L. J. 455, 468 & n.58 (1984);
Phoebe Ellsworth & Robert Levy, Legislative Reform of Child Custody Adjudication, 4 L.
& Soc'y Rev. 167, 202 (1969).
52 Many marriages end with the couple owning only their automobiles and perhaps a
small equity in a home. If the house must be sold and the proceeds divided and the woman
must find alternative housing for herself and the children, the small cash award of the
property division will be quickly spent.
53 See, for example, Lenore Weitzman, The Divorce Revolution (1981); Lenore Weitz-
man, The Economics of Divorce: Social and Economic Consequences of Property, Alimony
and Child Support Awards, 28 UCLA L. Rev. 1181 (1981); Fineman, Implementing Equal-
ity, supra note 47; Peters, supra note 46; Heather Wishik, Economics of Divorce: An
Exploratory Study, 20 Fain. L. Q. 79 (1986). Weitzman's work has been thoroughly criti-
cized in many circles, including the recent popular work by Susan Faludi, Backlash 19-27
(1991). See also Greg Duncan & Saul Hoffman, A Reconsideration of the Economic Conse-
quences of Marital Dissolution, 22 Demography 485 (1985); Suzanne Bianchi, Family Dis-
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There is yet another repercussion of no-fault divorce that has been
largely ignored in the literature, and that is its effect upon the marriage
contract itself. 4 The marriage obligations have been themselves rendered
illusory because no penalties can be exacted for breach of any marital
promises. There is therefore no incentive other than a moral obligation
or a feeling of affection to prevent either party from engaging in postcon-
tractual opportunism. 51 Some legislatures have tried to meet this objec-
tion to no-fault divorce as well, by compensating spouses who make
sacrifices during marriages. Courts, struggling with this problem, have
modified existing legal doctrines to recognize additional assets. 56 Pri-
vately, more and more couples have written antenuptial (and postnuptial)
contracts that can be the basis for actions for breach. 7 But there has
been little recognition of the cost of the problem, that is, a change in
economic incentives.
Although the divorce rate itself has leveled off after its steady growth
since the Second World War 8 and its upward shift from trend after the
introduction of no-fault statutes, there has been no apparent decrease in
opportunistic behavior. For one thing, more and more cases of spousal
ruption and Economic Hardship, Survey of Income and Program Participation, U.S. Bureau
of the Census, March, 1991, Series P-70, no. 23; and Martha Garrison, Marriage: The Status
of Contract, 131 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1039 (1983). Even Duncan and Hoffman, however, found
that women's living standards declined 30 percent in the first year after divorce, while
men's rose 10-15 percent. Although the question of whether women were much better off
following divorce under the fault system remains controversial, the perception that they
were is nearly universal. See Faludi, at 19. It is their perception (or fear of leaving) that
may allow opportunism.
51 It may, however, lie underneath Part 4 of Marjorie Schultz's Contractual Ordering of
Marriage: A New Model for State Policy, 70 Cal. L. Rev. 207 (1982); and it is certainly
discussed in Cohen, supra note 4; in Stake, supra note 35; and Scott, supra note 12.
55 Carl Schneider has reminded us that social norms inhibit breaching behavior even in
the business context. The Contract in Family Life and Business Practice, (paper presented
at the International Society for Family Law North American Conference, Moran, Wyoming,
June 11, 1993).
56 Obviously both alimony and property distribution are forms of division of future in-
come streams. An advanced degree earned during marriage is thus property to be distributed
at its dissolution, see O'Brien v. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743, 489 N.E.2d
712 (1985). Unlike most property, however, a degree does not have a fixed value at the
time of divorce but depends upon the contribution of the degree-holding spouse. See, for
example, Graham v. Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978). An award of its present
value therefore constricts the future behavior of a spouse in a way that dividing an asset
whose value is more completely determined upon market conditions does not.
57 Trebilcock & Keshvani, supra note 3, at 556-59, suggest that this will deter oppor-
tunism.
58 The rate leapt after no-fault divorce. Thomas Marvell, Divorce Rates and the Fault
Requirement, 23 L. & Soc'y Rev. 537, 546-63 (1978). The trend may reversing, at least
temporarily, although studies suggest that 60 percent of first-time marriages will eventually
end in divorce. Carlee Scott, As Baby Boomers Age, Fewer Couples Untie the Knot, Wall
St. J., November 7, 1990, at BI, col. 3.
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and child abuse are reported. Of course, this may be due either to in-
creased reporting facilities or to the increasing consciousness of women
who may believe, for the first time, that something may be done if they
complain about abuse. We would expect, however, this increase in re-
porting to occur across all states. Our empirical work attempts, through
regression analysis, to control for some of the variables which might
indicate increased reporting, such as per capita income. A second change
is that more and more decisions chronicle sacrifices made to advance the
career of an ungrateful spouse. It is possible, of course, that we are
dealing with "lagged" behavior. The investments in human capital char-
acteristic of the reported "degree division" cases occurred prior to a
realization by the disadvantaged spouses that such investments might not
be recouped. We would predict that henceforth there would be fewer
such marriage-specific investments. Thus women would be less likely to
specialize in household production or invest in their husbands' careers,
and more likely to continue working to advance their own careers during
the marriage. Some writers suggest that this behavior itself may under-
mine the marriage.59
These observations are consistent with the change from a paradigm
that recognized that marriage, like any other relational contract, provides
opportunities for rent-seeking opportunism. In the older system, the rule
of fault was designed to limit such rent-seeking behavior through its delin-
eation of implied or express covenants, violation of which led to breach
of the marital contract with its concomitant damage remedy. Since the
marriage contract can no longer be enforced, an unexpected consequence
of the "divorce revolution" is that the bargain itself has become il-
lusory. 6°
As we have already noted, many commentators see marriage as akin
to a contract terminable at will. 61 Outside the marriage context, however,
the principles of breach, and remedy for breach, remain in dischargeable
contracts while the agreements remain in effect. What currently happens
in marriages in many states 62 is that they are never effective contracts,
59 See, for example, Stake, supra note 35, at 405-6.
60 In some respects, the institution of marriage has come full circle: both in the covenant
marriage and in the new marriage any behavior is tolerable, albeit for different reasons.
61 See, for example, Scott, supra note 12, at 17; Haas, supra note 12, at 884; Stake,
supra note 35, at 401, 406.
62 Some states permit fault to bar or limit the award of alimony, while others have
eliminated it entirely. Although in all states no-fault divorce is available, no-fault alimony
is the rule in Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, California, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Iowa,
Maine, Montana, Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin, a total of thirteen states. In eight
states, marital misconduct amounting to grounds for fault divorce is an absolute bar to
alimony, and in twenty-eight and the District of Columbia, it may be a factor. Texas has
never offered postdivorce alimony.
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so that the parties to them are free to act opportunistically at minimal
cost.
6 3
III. MARRIAGE AS A RELATIONAL CONTRACT
Marriage before the age of divorce was a relationship in which the wife
had only a slight source of power because she could threaten to impose
a minimal financial burden on the husband if he "abandoned" her. The
husband, however, had a very great deal of power because he could
threaten to "cast out" the wife, whereupon she would have only very
limited sources of income/social standing and no opportunity to re-
marry.' One would expect to find, and did find, many "marriages of
convenience" where marital fidelity was not important, particularly for
husbands,6" and wives were thought of in some ways as little more than
servants.
66
There were all sorts of problems with this characterization of marriage,
including the fact that husbands would frequently desert their wives,
leaving them remediless and without any property or other means of
support.67 The law gradually evolved, in consequence, to a new form of
"equilibrium marriage," where there was a state-imposed set of contrac-
tual obligations, a remedy for breach (specific performance through ali-
mony, or continuation of the duty of support), 6 and a clear understanding
of what was and was not permissible behavior. For this period of some-
where in the neighborhood of two hundred years in this country, marriage
63 Schneider noted recently that social norms inhibit negative behavior even in the busi-
ness context. See Schneider, supra note 55. In both business and family relations, freedom
to take advantage often leads to opportunistic behavior. Charles Meyers & Steven Crafton,
The Covenant of Further Exploitation-Thirty Years Later, 32 Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Inst.
1 (1986).
64 Anthony Kronman, Paternalism in the Law of Contracts, 92 Yale L. J. 783 (1983),
notes that substitution of damages for specific performance of obligations may increase
feelings of regret, and threaten "moral health."
65 Gerhard Mueller, Inquiry into the State of a Divorceless Society, 18 U. Pitt. L. Rev.
545, 577-78 (1957).
66 See, for example, Amy Stanley, Conjugal Bonds and Wage Labor: Rights of Contract
in the Age of Emancipation, 75 J. Am. Hist. 471 (1988).
67 Mueller, supra note 65, at 559, 567, 572, suggests that there was also a tremendous
amount of adultery, migratory divorces, and even wife selling.
68 See, for example, Smith v. Smith, 530 So. 2d 1389, 1988 Ala. LEXIS 424 (1988); Kelly
v. Kelly, 183 Ky. 172, 180, 209 S.W. 335, 338 (1919); Hecht v. Hecht, 259 Cal. App. 2d I,
67 Cal. Rptr. 293 (1968); Stoner v. Stoner, 163 Conn. 345, 307 A.2d 146 (1972); Nelson v.
Nelson, 282 Mo. 412, 221 S.W. 1066 (1920); Anderson v. Anderson, 104 Utah 104, 138 P.2d
252 (1943); Tonjes v. Tonjes, 24 Wis. 2d 120, 128 N.W.2d 446 (1964); but see Aubert v.
Aubert, 129 N.H. 422, 529 A.2d 909 (1987); and Heacock v. Heacock, 402 Mass. 21, 520
N.E.2d 151 (1988).
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was a contract, 69 but because of its complexity and indeterminate length,
it was a relational or institutional contract, one in which the parties were
incapable of reducing important terms of the arrangement to well-defined
obligations.7"
North Dakota in 1985 became the last state to adopt no-fault divorce, 71
meaning that fault on the part of the other spouse need not be proved by
the plaintiff in order to obtain a divorce. Some states, those we have
called "no-fault" in this article, go a step further.72 In these, fault cannot
be considered either in obtaining the divorce or in securing alimony, so
there can be no significant activities that trigger breach. There can be no
breach and no remedies, and the contract has become illusory. The wife
may have even less power than in the divorceless form of marriage be-
cause the only threat she can make is that it may take the husband some
time to replace her "household services" after their divorce (either by
purchase or remarriage). It is more difficult for the woman to remarry,
and she usually earns far less than the husband in the job market, for a
variety of reasons.73 Upon leaving, therefore, she loses more than he
does, which gives him more bargaining power.74 The cost of deviant be-
havior has decreased, so one would predict both that there will be more
divorces and that there will be more opportunistic behavior by spouses.75
This opportunism should occur primarily in marriages entered into un-
der the old rules. For couples marrying more recently, the effect would
be different and more complex. Our empirical work looks at both types
69 Interestingly enough, however, it was during this period that Joel Bishop, in his Com-
mentaries on the Law of Marriage and Divorce § 3 (6th ed. 1881), began the notion that
marriage was a status.
7 See Goetz & Scott, supra note 27, at 1091; Meyers & Crafton, supra note 63.
7' Although the state laws vary from divorce upon a showing of "irreconcilable differ-
ences" to those allowing divorce after separation for a specified period of time ranging
from six months to three years, basically all states now allow marriage to be terminable at
will. See Scott, supra note 12, at 17-18.
72 We disagree with Peters's division between "unilateral" and "mutual" divorce states
according to 1978 divorce laws. One problem is that she puts the states retaining fault
grounds as well as "unilateral" grounds into the unilateral category because "in these states
the unilateral rule dominates." Peters, supra note 46, at 446. The other problem is that in
several of her "unilateral" states, fault can still be used in the determination of alimony.
Because we used data from years up through 1987, it is also relevant that some states have
changed to what we would call a pure no-fault system since 1978.
71 See Regan's thoughtful discussion of these issues, supra note 47.
74 It may be the threat of leaving that in fact triggers spouse abuse. Joan Mahoney, Legal
Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1991).
75 People now pay attention to the situation where one spouse obtains a divorce after
the other has worked to allow his or her graduate education, whether the other has been
bilked systematically of assets for a separately held business enterprise, or where there is
spousal or child abuse. See notes 92-94 infra.
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of effects. Spouse abuse measures the first sort of effect: the effect of the
change in regimes upon marriages entered into under the older system, or
at least where there was not sufficient understanding of what the new
system might mean in terms of compensation upon divorce. With mar-
riages contemplated when no-fault divorce has been in place for some
years, we would expect effects on the number of marriages contracted
and the number of children.
IV. AN EMPIRICAL LOOK AT OPPORTUNISM IN MARRIAGE
The predictable consequences of marriage becoming an illusory con-
tract therefore involve both ex ante and ex post conduct. In order to stave
off opportunism, there would be less long-term marriage contracting. 6 Ex
post, for those already married when unilateral no-fault divorce becomes
possible, there should be less investment in the marriage (fewer chil-
dren)77 and more "taking advantage," or opportunism. There are data
available on the first two of these, for academics including lawyers, soci-
ologists, and economists have been interested for many years in the rates
of marriage and fertility. What we test here is this behavior over time,
contrasting birth and marriage rates in states with fault and no-fault re-
gimes and looking at rates before and after the introduction of no-fault
divorce.
The ability to impose opportunistic outcomes should be greater for the
party with the lower costs of divorce. To the extent that the nonenforce-
ability of marriage benefits one gender (the man) so that marriage be-
comes more attractive, 78 it acts to deter the other gender (the woman).
That is, for the man it may be more attractive to marry rather than to stay
in a nonmarital relationship with a particular woman. This is because, so
long as the relationship is good, he gets all the benefits of the security
76 Cohen, supra note 4, at 296, notes Landes's article, supra note 12, which studied the
effect of the elimination of alimony on the number of marriages and the rate of marital
fertility, finding that both decreased where alimony was unavailable. Cohen writes that "it
is not clear if the causality runs from the divorce laws to the marriage rate or if both are
moved by some independent vector of other variables." Cohen at 296 & n.63.
77 Wardle, supra note 13, at 126, also sees lack of commitment as related to no-fault
divorce (which he defines differently than we do in this article). Because they are easier to
obtain, there should also be more divorces. Peters, supra note 46; Marvell, supra note 58.
78 This occurs in part because for men the investment during marriage is, at least tradition-
ally, more general. Women are more likely to invest in marriage-specific capital and are
less likely to invest in the human capital necessary for success in the labor force. See Joan
Krauskopf, Recompense for Financing Spouse's Education: Legal Protection for the Marital
Investor in Human Capital, 28 Kansas L. Rev. 379, 397 (1980); Joan Krauskopf, Theories
of Property Division/Spousal Support: Searching for Solutions to the Mystery, 23 Fam. L.
Q. 253, 260-67 (1989); Carbone & Brinig, supra note 3, at 976-77.
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and companionship and provision of services that marriage provides. If
things sour, he may leave with little penalty other than the fees for filing
for divorce and to pay his attorney.79 For the woman, in contrast, the
costs of divorce have increased through the introduction of no-fault di-
vorce, particularly if she desires to have children.80 Although the prospect
of marriage, as opposed to one or more nonmarital relationships, may be
appealing, being married is probably less important than formerly be-
cause of the reliability of contraceptives, her increased earnings in the
labor market (higher opportunity cost), and the growing social acceptabil-
ity of cohabitation. Since there is no compensating payment by men, and
there must be agreement between husband and wife for the contract to
be formed, there should be fewer marriages as women become aware of
its costs. In fact, there is some evidence that this is occurring.8 See
Figure 1.
Since there is no real measure of the cost of divorce, or any data on
the number of antenuptial contracts (since they are not registered with
any official agency), the equation we tested was far simpler. We looked
at the number of marriages per thousand population for the years 1965-87
as a function of population per state, the presence of true no-fault di-
vorce, and a trend (or time) variable.82
The pooled time series regression appears as Table 1. What it shows
79 There is increasingly less social stigma attached to divorce. Arland Thornton, Changing
Attitudes toward Separation and Divorce: Causes and Consequences, 90 Am. J. Soc. 856
(1985). Thus the "reputational effect" of the noncooperative behavior of seeking a unilateral
divorce may be ineffective to promote cooperation in the marriage. See Scott, supra note
22, at 2034.
8o The transaction costs of obtaining a divorce have decreased for both spouses. See, for
example, Margaret Brinig & Michael Alexeev, Trading at Divorce: Preferences, Legal Rules
and Transactions Costs, 8 Ohio St. J. Dispute Resolution 279 (1993); Peters, supra note 46.
These lower transaction costs are dominated for women by the higher economic and social
costs of being a divorced person, frequently one with custody. Women with small children
do not remarry as often, or as speedily, as other divorced women, and their subsequent
marriages are also more likely to end in divorce. Gary Becker, Elisabeth Landes, & Robert
Michael, An Economic Analysis of Marital Instability, 85 J. Pol. Econ. 1141, 1152, 1157
(1977). Single mothers of young children must also obtain child care for the times when
they are dating.
81 National Center for Health Statistics, Monthly Vital Statistics Report (August 26,
1991). In 1988, marriages among unmarried women ages 15-44 fell to its lowest rate ever,
91 per 1,000 compared to 147.2 per 1,000 in 1967. See also K. A. London, Cohabitation,
Marriage, Marital Dissolution and Remarriage, U.S. 1988 Advance Data, Vital and Health
Statistics No. 194; Barbara Vobejda, Americans Spending Less Time Married, Wash. Post,
August 26, 1991, at Al.
Of course, the party more eager to marry (the man) could bribe the other's acquiescence
through promises of a more favorable "deal" upon divorce. More couples would then enter
into antenuptial agreements. We have no way of measuring the extent to which this occurs.
See Trebilcock & Keshvani, supra note 3, at 446-59.
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FIGURE 1
is that, during the years examined, the number of marriages per thousand
population has generally increased. This general increase, however, has
not taken place in the more populous states. (One might surmise that this
is primarily where there is more cohabitation outside marriage.) Nor has
the general increase taken place in the no-fault states: marriage is nega-
tively and significantly related to the presence of a true no-fault regime.
We therefore cannot reject our hypothesis that the presence of no-fault
decreased the willingness of women to commit themselves to marriage.
83
The matter of the effect of no-fault divorce on children is more prob-
lematic since a number of factors besides changes in no-fault regimes
have undoubtedly contributed to the declining birth rate in the United
States and other industrialized nations,' and there is a correlation be-
83 Obviously there is a host of other variables affecting the marriage rate. Some are
captured in the trend variable. Some account for the large portion of the variance that was
not explained by this analysis.
8' These include, in addition to a changed divorce, the change in the number of married
women working, the fact that more women defer children until they complete higher educa-
tion, the attractiveness for some couples of small families, and the availability of reliable
contraception and legal abortion. There is a large literature on the economics of fertility.
See, for example, Peters, supra note 46, at 452; Gary Becker & Nigel Tomes, Child Endow-
ments and the Quantity and Quality of Children, 84 J. Pol. Econ. S143 (1976).
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TABLE I
POOLED TIME-SERIES REGRESSION: MARRIAGE, 1965-87
Estimated Standard t-Ratio Partial
Variable Name Coefficient Error (1,001 df) Correlation
TREND .041792 .0056401 7.4099 .2280
POP - .00013553 .000016473 -8.2278 -. 2517
NFDUMMY -1.1819 .20748 -5.6963 -. 1772
CONSTANT 12.152 .15007 80.977 .9314
tween these factors: women are earning more in the marketplace and
therefore have a greater opportunity cost in staying home to raise children
(or even in taking time off to bear them)." The real prospect of divorce
for spouses in every state has indicated, even to those already married,
that it is risky to bring children into a relationship, both because divorce
is very difficult for children and because, for women, the presence of
children reduces their chances of remarriage and their income earning
potential.8 6 This must be qualified since children could act as hostages to
hold together an otherwise unenforceable contract. But this assumes that
the consequences to both parties of divorce would be equally cata-
strophic. In fact, for whatever reason, women seem to value children
more highly than do their husbands. 7 As discussed above, women usually
end up with custody and, because of children, are less able to obtain high
paying full-time employment or remarry. It might be assumed that, as
with marriage, there would be countervailing incentives for men that
85 Fathers share these costs as well since they must, theoretically at least, bear an in-
creased share of child care if their wives are working. But see Shelley Coverman & Joseph
Sheley, Change in Men's Housework and Child-Care Time, 1965-1975, 48 J. Marriage &
Fam. 413, 420 (1986); Michael Geerken & Walter Gove, At Home and at Work: The Fam-
ily's Division of Labor (1983), suggesting that not much change in the allocation of these
responsibilities has occurred. The "domestic burden" borne by wives has been estimated
to account for 70 percent of the difference in earnings between married men and women.
Ellman, supra note 4, at 4 & n.2.
86 Haas, supra note 12, at 887-88. See also Fuchs, supra note 50. For men the negative
is primarily paying child support. They may shirk this obligation because they cannot
control how the money is spent by the custodial former wives. Yoram Weiss & Robert
Willis, Children as Collective Goods in Divorce Settlements, 3 J. Lab. Econ. 268 (1985).
87 See Fuchs, supra note 50, at 67-68. Our referee has pointed out that, to the extent
that children are important to their fathers, it might be in the interest of any particular
mother to threaten to make visitation difficult in the event of divorce. If all women made
such a credible threat, conscientious fathers might try harder to keep their marriages to-
gether, with a resultant cultural norm of lifetime marriages. Following divorce, however,
it is not in the mother's interest to carry out the threat, especially if she is conscientious.
Since marriages which result in children are not usually a repeat game, whether or not she
carries out the threat herself will probably not affect her individual case, and the cultural




POOLED TIME-SERIES REGRESSION: BIRTHS PER THOUSAND, 1965-87
Estimated Standard t-Ratio Partial
Variable Name Coefficient Error (1,001 df) Correlation
MARRIAGE .58113E-2 .34108E-2 1.7038 .0538
TREND -. 15027 .83029E-2 - 18.098 - .4965
NFDUMMY - .55521 .16723 -3.3200 -. 1044
CONSTANT 19.153 .14503 132.06 .9725
would encourage having children. But women are particularly well situ-
ated to prevent pregnancy through contraception and are uniquely able
to terminate it by abortion. They therefore have much greater control
over the decision. 88 Unquestionably, there has been a decreasing fertility
rate, but so far there has been no showing that the birth rate is lower in
those states with no-fault divorce than elsewhere. We ran a simple pooled
time-series regression for the period 1965-87, testing the birth rate per
thousand population against marriage, population, the availability of no-
fault divorce, and time. 89 The results are included in Table 2. What Table
2 shows is that the birth rate has significantly decreased over time. The
relationship between the birth rate and the marriage rate is not statisti-
cally significant (although positive). Most important for our analysis is
the fact that, as we would predict, there are fewer births per thousand
population in those states that have adopted a true no-fault regime.
This article is one of the first to focus on opportunism that occurs after
marriage has taken place.90 We argue that no-fault divorce raises the
opportunity costs of divorce for those who are the victims of spouse
abuse because of the strong wealth effects in no-fault states. 91 For the
88 Although in functioning marriages husbands and wives are likely to agree on whether
or not the wife should abort, the U.S. Supreme Court maintains that a state cannot require
a married woman to notify her husband of her decision. Planned Parenthood of Southern
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 1992 U.S. LEXIS 2751, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). Even if the husband
used no contraception, the wife could still prevent the pregnancy.
89 A reader has expressed the concern that the model is underspecified: that is, that we
should have included such independent variables as income, female labor force participa-
tion, urbanization, race, and ethnic composition. This would be important to the extent
that these are correlated with the no-fault variable, but we have not found a correlation.
For a general discussion of choice of variables in linear regression, see John Neter &
William Wasserman, Applied Linear Statistical Models 371 (1974).
90 Cohen's opportunism involves the unilateral termination of marriage by the husband
before the wife can reap the "quasi rents" she expected in the later years of marriage when
her value in the marriage market falls relative to his. Cohen, supra note 4, at 288-89.
91 Of course, it is possible that other things are going on here. Women need not face the
proof problems of the fault system or the prospect of desertion, both of which were barriers
to exit. If these were important, there should be more rather than less abuse in states
retaining fault. The other possibility is that we are only measuring the level of reporting,
which undoubtedly varies from state to state. Reporting would be affected by the effective-
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abusing husband, the opportunity costs of divorce are reduced on the
margin because there are no real damages granted for his breach. In
divorce he loses only the person he was married to, not any of his other
wealth. The types of resulting opportunistic behavior that could be pre-
dicted in such an illusory marriage contract involve the situations where
one spouse leaves shortly after the other has worked to allow his or her
graduate education, 92 where one has swindled the other systematically of
assets for a separately held business enterprise, 93 where there is adul-
tery,94 or where there is spousal or child abuse. Although the first three
situations can be analyzed theoretically,95 there is no way to obtain accu-
rate data on the number of cases in which such self-seeking behavior has
occurred. The degree or investment cases are anecdotal. Litigation will
only occur when a change in the interpretation of the law is involved, so
that the reported cases are not a fair sample of all times in which this has
occurred and divorce has followed. Obviously the cases do not count the
many times in which such an investment is made and there is no divorce.
Even the claimed incidence of adultery cannot be gauged from the plead-
ings in the no-fault states since, by definition, fault cannot be considered.
It is possible, however, to obtain data on spousal abuse.
Violence between spouses has undoubtedly been a problem for centu-
ries, but it was not usually the subject of legal intervention because, as
one court said in 1868, "We will not inflict upon society the greater evil
of raising the curtain upon domestic privacy to punish the lesser evil of
trifling violence." 96 National attention, however, has focused on domestic
violence since the mid-1970s. 97
Since there is no central government or other authority that collects or
indexes information about spousal abuse by state, data were obtained for
ness of state protective orders, the frequency of police response, and the availability of
social service networks. Our empirical analysis attempts to capture many of these favors.
What the statistics show is that it is highly unlikely that our results were reached by chance.
92 Cohen, supra note 4; Katharine Baker, Contracting for Security: Paying Married
Women What They've Earned, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1193 (1988).
93 See Francois v. Francois, 599 F.2d 1286 (V.I. 1979).
94 Cohen, supra note 4, at 300, predicts that there should be more extramarital affairs
because the "law can do little to enforce the most meaningful and possibly onerous obliga-
tions of a marriage."
95 Sam Rea worked this out for degree cases in Breaking Up Is Hard to Do (Working
Paper presented at the American Law and Economics Association Annual Meeting, Chi-
cago, April 30, 1993).
96 See note 34 supra.
97 U.S. Congress, Domestic Violence and Legislation with Respect to Domestic Violence,
Hearings before the Subcommittee on Child and Human Development, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess., 1978; Note, The Battered Wife Syndrome and Self-Defense: A Legal and Empirical
Dissent, 72 Va. L. Rev. 619 (1986).
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the single year of 1987 by contacting agencies in each state that would
have information about crisis calls and shelter care provided for victims
of spouse abuse. 98 Table 3 contains an alphabetical list of reported crisis
calls and shelter visits by state. 99 Table 4 contains a ranking of states by
number of crisis calls reported per thousand population.
Our theory would predict that the incidence of "negative" opportunism
within marriage (behavior outside what would otherwise be the norm),
proxied by spouse abuse, should increase in states allowing divorce and
alimony without consideration of fault (EARLY and LATE)."° Of
course, abuse does not occur solely because of relaxed penalties in terms
of divorce settlements. Abuse in the family (ABUSECAP) might also be
expected to vary with such social characteristics as income per capita
(INCOMEPC), urbanization (METROPOP), and the amount of violent
crime in general (CRIME). Abuse might be more readily reported by
some segments of the population than others (RELIG),' °' so that these
groups would show greater numbers of crisis calls. Box-Cox regressional
analysis was performed using the above factors as the independent (right-
hand side) variables, with the number of crisis calls to abuse centers as
the dependent variable.
The resulting estimated equation predicted about 35 percent of the
variance in calls to abuse shelters. See Table 5. As predicted, spouse
abuse occurred with greater frequency in states that had abolished con-
sideration of fault in divorce and its incidents. It also varied positively and
significantly with the reporting variables and with income' 2 and varied
negatively and significantly with urbanization and insignificantly with po-
litical liberalism (DEM). 1°3 The general incidence of violent crime was
not significantly related to the number of spouse-abuse complaints, but
98 Of course, victims of violence who are not married may also use these services. In
states that separate the types of complaints, however, the incidence of nonspouse abuse
was negligible.
99 A date indicates the year a no-fault system was enacted. A zero indicates that fault is
still available either in the grounds for divorce or in allocation of alimony or property
distribution. In two states (Hawaii and Vermont), data for crisis calls were unavailable.
The number used was extrapolated from the number of shelter days. It should be noted
that, although these numbers are approximations, if the two states are eliminated, our
empirical results are still stronger.
100 Not only the presence of no-fault divorce but also the date the scheme was enacted
makes a difference. We therefore ordered the data based upon whether no-fault legislation
was enacted prior to 1975 (EARLY), between 1975 and the present (LATE), or not at all.
101 This variable is a composite of those reporting to be Christians and Jews.
102 This also may be a proxy for a willingness to report.
103 We used the percentage popular vote for the Democrat (Mondale) in the 1984 elec-
tions.
TABLE 3
SPOUSE ABUSE BY STATE, 1987
Year of
Enactment Crisis Shelter
State Name of No-Fault* Calls Visits
Alabama 0 5,262 ...
Alaska 1974 23,419 8,080
Arizona 0 19,893 6,700
Arkansas 0 3,458 1,163
California 1969 11,684 32,766
Colorado 1971 52,956 8,217
Connecticut 0 20,000 1,106
Delaware 1979 1,185
Florida 1978 60,088 7,859
Georgia 0 20,273 2,074
Hawaii 1972 1,557 244
Idaho 0 4,087 827
Illinois 1984 385,700 30,856
Indiana 1973 109,704 3,741
Iowa 1970 4,543 ...
Kansas 0 22,186 1,838
Kentucky 1972 25,927 2,227
Louisiana 0 10,707 1,213
Maine 0 6,200 6,200
Maryland 0 14,107 ...
Massachusetts 0 54,000 5,496
Michigan 1974 48,071 7,044
Minnesota 0 16,542 3,752
Mississippi 1973 13,274 ...
Missouri 1975 25,062 5,169
Montana 1972 1,180 ...
Nebraska 0 44,479 4,651
Nevada 0 4,837 2,773
New Hampshire 0 6,079 1,714
New Jersey 0 52,209
New Mexico 0 11,133 1,925
New York 0 97,542 9,126
North Carolina 0 23,754 7,721
North Dakota 0 1,330 ...
Ohio 0 18,292 ...
Oklahoma 1971 8,181 7,235
Oregon 0 36,452 2,477
Pennsylvania 0 11,702 11,702
Rhode Island 0 17,968 2,196
South Carolina 0 1,812 396
South Dakota 0 9,863 1,192
Tennessee 0 19,595 1,857
Texas 0 387,000 23,805
Utah 0 7,972 1,294
Vermont 0 34,733 5,439
Virginia 0 13,597 1,851
Washington 1973 18,000 3,200
West Virginia 0 16,000 366
Wisconsin 1977 43,299 2,839
Wyoming 0 37,152 1,172
* A zero indicates that fault is still available, either in the grounds for
divorce or in allocation of alimony or property distribution.
TABLE 4
ABUSE PER CAPITA, 1987
Year of
Crisis Calls/ Enactment of








Rhode Island 18.22312 0
Colorado 16,06675 1971





New Mexico 7.422 0
Kentucky 6.956533 1972
New Jersey 6.805136 0
Connecticut 6.228589 0
Arizona 5.88 0














North Carolina 3.704039 0














West Virginia .843437 0
South Carolina .529051 0
* A zero indicates that fault is still available, either in the grounds for
divorce or in allocation of alimony or property distribution.
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TABLE 5
PREDICTORS OF SPOUSAL ABUSE
Estimated Standard t-Ratio Partial
Variable Name Coefficient Error (42 df) Correlation
EARLY .67572 .28007 2.4127* .3489
LATE - .08619 .26201 -. 32896 - .0507
METROPOP -2.1754 .82868 - 2.625 1* - .3754
RELIG 2.1301 1.00850 2.1122* .3099
CRIME 1.2141 .68497 1.7725 .2638
INCOMEPC 19.080 5.0156 3.8041* .5062
DEM -2.4790 1.4254 -1.7392 - .2592
CONSTANT -77.149 21.276 -3.6262 - .4883
* Significant at .05.
was positively signed. Abuse indeed seems to be related to the absence
of penalties embodied in the divorce statutes.1°4
V. IN SEARCH OF THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT
Our model predicts that no-fault has caused a change in the distribution
so that behavior within marriage has become more variable. It has also
caused a reduction in the investment in marriage and children that would
occur otherwise. The presence of fault divorce caused the marriage con-
tract's ex ante and ex post values to be relatively similar. There used to
be incentives to marry, to have children, and not to surprise the marriage
partner. °5 Now, with no-fault, the risk or uncertainty associated with
marriage has increased.
The puzzle becomes how to provide incentives so that once again the
majority of behavior clusters around what most people conceive of as
"marriage." Without a wholesale reallocation of property rights, the
mechanism that would seem most efficient is to provide once again for
breach if significant events occur."° This could be done without resurrect-
104 Tobit analysis endogenizing the timing and presence of no-fault divorce as a function
of Catholicism (negatively related), women in the labor force (positively related), the di-
vorce-to-marriage ratio (positively and already significantly related), and political liberalism
(positively related) identifies only the extremes of early enactment of no-fault legislation
and the lack of no-fault.
5 Compare Becker, Landes, & Michael, supra note 80, suggesting that divorce occurs
at least in part because during the marriage the spouses gain more (undesirable) information
about each other.
t"O This view is supported at least in part by Haas, supra note 12, at 894-95; Cohen,
supra note 4, at 302-3; and Carl E. Schneider, Rethinking Alimony: Marital Decisions and
Moral Discourse, 1991 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 197, 253.
MARRIAGE AND OPPORTUNISM
ing fault as grounds for divorce but would require the use of fault in the
awarding of alimony.' °7 In the language of contract theory, contractual
partners could dissolve their contracts voluntarily, but if the dissolution
were a result of breach of the agreement, then a damage remedy would
be available to the nonbreaching party. If it is clearly understood what
the marriage contract entails, significant breach of the terms of the agree-
ment could then, once again, result in an award of "damages" through
the alimony system.
A similar result, in terms of compensation, could theoretically be
reached either by allowing an action for damages in tort for such outra-
geous behavior as spouse abuse'1 8 or in restitution for investments made
in the other's career. But any action outside the divorce system would
be expensive (because of the increase in transaction costs), might require
abrogation of interspousal immunity,' 09 and apparently is not giving
spouses the incentive to abide by the marital contract.
Robert Scott speaks of various mechanisms for insuring optimum in-
vestments in commercial long-term contracts. He concludes that transfer-
ring risk to the party best able to control the production process, or to
the party subjectively placing a lower cost on the risk, or distributing the
risk between the parties will all decrease the likelihood of opportunism.' 10
107 Although mutual consent divorce may seem attractive for law and economics scholars,
see, for example, Allen Parkman, What's at Fault with No-Fault? (1992); Stake, supra note
35, it is not really an improvement. Mutual consent is in some ways like an order for specific
performance of a personal services contract. The prevailing party can expect minimal per-
formance in a situation that calls for mutual good feelings. Margaret Brinig, The Law and
Economics of No-Fault Divorce, 26 Fam. L. Q. 453, 468-69 (1993); Cohen, supra note 4,
at 299-301. Further, in modem times the granting of divorce is primarily a right to remarry.
See, for example, Avitzur v. Avitzur, 58 N.Y.2d 108, 459 N.Y.S.2d 572, 446 N.E.2d 136
(1983). The need to divorce in order to remarry may not be systematically related to being
the party breaching the marriage contract.
108 There have been a number of successful suits in tort for abuse committed during the
marriage. See, for example, Windauer v. O'Connor, 13 Ariz. App. 442, 477 P.2d 561 (1971);
Simmons v. Simmons, 1988 Colo. App. LEXIS 430, 773 P.2d 602 (1988); Hudson v. Hudson,
Superior Court of Delaware Sussex, Slip Opinion, April 28, 1987; Nash v. Overholser, 114
Idaho 461, 757 P.2d 1180 (1988); Duplechin v. Toce, 497 So. 2d 763 (La. 1987); Heacock
v. Heacock, 402 Mass. 21, 520 N.E.2d 151 (1988); Aubert v. Aubert, 129 N.H. 422, 529,
A.2d 909 (1987); Murphy v. Murphy, 109 App. Div. 2d 965, 486 N.Y.S.2d 457 (1985); Noble
v. Noble, 1988 Utah LEXIS 72, 761 P.2d 1369 (1988).
109 See, for example, Heino v. Harper, 306 Ore. 347, 759 P.2d 253 (1988), for a thorough
modem analysis.
110 Scott, supra note 22, at 2021. Under Scott's analysis, risk would be transferred to the
man, who might have to place assets as collateral for the promise of subsequent cooperation
or provide for liquidated damages should breach occur. Id. Reliance upon alimony, since
the amount will not be determined ex ante, avoids the perils of liquidated damages, which
are often construed by courts as penalty clauses. See Alan Schwartz, The Myth That
Promisees Prefer Supracompensatory Remedies: An Analysis of Contracting for Damage
Measures, 100 Yale L. J. 369 (1990).
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His ideas are echoed in the marital context by the then chairman of the
American Bar Association Family Law Section, who wrote: "Substantial
fault preserves the concept of individual accountability, which is missing
from pure no-fault theories. One way to discourage adultery, physical
cruelty or other genuine misconduct is to place the burden of dissolution
squarely on the shoulders of the responsible party. Pureno-fault removes
this disincentive and, indeed, promotes easy access to divorce without
regard to accountability." ''
All of the problems we have discussed-fewer marriages, less specific
investment in children, and more opportunistic behavior-can, at least
in part, be linked to the inability to enforce marital promises characteris-
tic of what we have called no-fault divorce. As a society, we need to
rethink the question of whether this particular reform is worth it.
11 Harvey Golden & J. Michael Taylor, Fault Enforces Accountability, 10 Fain. Advoc.
11, 12-13 (1987). This echoes Schwartz, supra note 12, at 232.
